Appellate court finds jury should have been instructed with the federal regulation requiring commercial truckers to use extreme caution in bad road conditions

I think the Second District was wrong in Weaver v. Chavez. 

The issue is a jury instruction in a civil case arising out of an automobile accident, which involved a commercial truck sailing into a stalled car in bad weather.  The trial court disallowed the plaintiff's proposed special instruction, which would have re-stated a federal regulation requiring commercial truckers driving in bad road conditions to use extreme caution.  Instead, the trial court only instructed on the basic speed law, which prohibits driving faster than particular road conditions permit.  A jury rendered a defense verdict (10-2).  The appellate court reversed, holding that the proposed instruction was warranted and that but for the omitted instruction, the outcome would have been different.

First, it is not at all clear the instruction was required.  The trial court did not have to give duplicative instructions and the proposed instruction seems duplicative of the basic speed law instruction.  Unlike the Court, I do not think there is any material difference between the regulation and the basic speed law.  Under the basic speed law, any reasonably prudent person driving a heavy commercial truck in bad weather (rain, fog, snow, poor visibility, heavy traffic, etc) must exercise extreme caution or he or she is negligent.  That is the essence of the federal regulation the plaintiff wanted to instruct the jury with.  (49 C.F.R., sec. 392.14.) 

Also, the court's opinion on prejudice is not all that convincing: there is no indication that the jury was ambivalent about the standard of care or that counsel's closing argument somehow created an impression of a lesser standard of care for the truck driver.  Really, the difference between the federal regulation and the basic speed law is a sematic one for lawyers and judges, not a real one for Los Angeles jurors who drive many miles every day.

Second, it does not seem the Court realizes it just expanded tort liability.  By allowing this federal regulation to serve as a standard of care, the court implicitly concludes that the regulation was intended to create tort liability.  That may or may not be true, but it certainly requires more analysis of the text and history of the regulation.  The opinion does not touch on that issue at all.